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Although we cannot conceive of processes of economic growth that do not involve
institutional change, in this essay we outline some reasons why one should be cautious about
grounding a theory of growth on institutions. We emphasize how very different institutional
structures have often been found to be reasonable substitutes for each other, both in dissimilar as
well as similar contexts. The historical record, therefore, does not seem to support the notion that
any particular institution, narrowly defined, is indispensable for growth. Moreover, we discuss how
the evidence that there are systematic patterns to the ways institutions evolve undercuts the idea that
exogenous change in institutions is what powers growth. Institutions matter, but our thinking of how
they matter should recognize that they are profoundly influenced by the political and economic
environment, and that if any aspect of institutions is crucial for growth, it is that institutions change
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Economists have long been concerned with the explanation of differences across 
countries in levels of national income, population, and per capita incomes, as well as in 
their rates of growth.  Because many of the processes of economic development are 
presumed to operate over long periods of time, those studying the sources of these 
differences have quite naturally turned to the historical record for relevant evidence.     
Their concern with economic history thus comes not only from a desire to achieve a 
better understanding of the past, but also from by a belief that such knowledge can serve 
as a guide for policymakers striving to improve the economic and social conditions of 
currently less developed nations.  Many scholars have set about making contributions to 
knowledge through detailed investigations of the processes of growth in individual 
countries.  Others have sought to discern what factors were crucial through comparative 
studies, focusing on issues such as why nations differed with regard to the timing of the 
onset of growth or how and why their records of achieved rates of growth varied over a 
long period of time.   
Recently considerable attention has been given to the question of why European 
nations and some of their overseas offshoots expanded more rapidly than did the 
economies of Asia, Africa, and Latin America after the eighteenth century, either 
generating new gaps in levels of income and rates of growth, or else greatly widening 
whatever differentials may have previously existed (see Table 1).
1 Previously the 
principal focus of historians examining the basis for differences in long-term economic 
performance had been with what led Great Britain to accomplish an Industrial Revolution 
sometime after the middle of the eighteenth century, and ahead of its European rivals (see 
Table 2).
2  Given the greater similarity of economic, political, and social structures   3
among the European nations than those between Europe and the rest of the world, the 
factors highlighted in the discussions of the development of the Industrial Revolution are 
rather different from those generally featured in the broader geographic comparisons. In 
both cases, however, what the economists and economic historians are seeking to explain 
is why some nations in today’s world remain poor, relatively and absolutely, and what 
conditions can be changed in order to achieve success in spurring growth and improving 
the welfare of the respective populations.  It is this problem that the recent study of 
institutions has sought to help resolve and that probably represents its most significant 
contribution.   
It is not necessary here to attempt to catalogue the full set of explanations that 
have been given for differences in economic development, since many books and articles, 
published and forthcoming, have already done that.  For present purposes, however, we 
highlight a transition over the last few decades from a concentration on the role of 
narrowly-defined economic factors to a focus on the significance of various social 
structures and culture in providing the conditions conducive to economic development.
3  
Arguments based on conditions such as favorable natural resources (including accessible 
coal and iron, in the case of Britain), high rates of capital formation, and extensive 
markets or other circumstances that encourage a faster pace of technological change, 
which had long been central to our understanding of why some economies enjoyed better 
performance, have been replaced (or supplemented) by arguments concerned with how 
differences across societies in political and cultural institutions arose, and how they 
influence the processes of growth.
4   Although we cannot conceive of processes of 
economic growth that do not involve institutional change, in this essay we outline some   4
reasons why one should be cautious about grounding a theory of growth on institutions.  
We emphasize how very different institutional structures have often been found to be 
reasonable substitutes for each other, both in dissimilar as well as similar contexts.  The 
historical record, therefore, does not seem to support the notion that any particular 
institution, narrowly defined, is indispensable for growth.  Moreover, we discuss how the 
evidence that there are systematic patterns to the ways institutions evolve undercuts the 
idea that exogenous change in institutions is what powers growth.  Institutions matter, but 
our thinking of how they matter should recognize that they are profoundly influenced by 
the political and economic environment, and that if any aspect of institutions is crucial for 
growth, it is that institutions must change over time as circumstances change.   
 
II. 
A basic categorization of explanations for economic growth would include 
economic, cultural, political, and institutional factors.  The import of economic factors 
was much discussed in the ancient world, and amongst the numerous economic factors 
that have been considered since that time are:  natural resources, such as the supplies of 
coal and iron; the opportunity to trade at low cost with other regions or nations, which 
provides markets that encourage specialization in producing goods in which the economy 
has a comparative advantage (and perhaps stimulating more rapid technical progress) as 
well as serves as a source of imports that a nation may be incapable of producing; 
climate, which can influence productivity through a variety of mechanisms; colonial 
empire, which might be associated with especially high private or social returns to 
investment; and the role of population change.  Some contend, for example, that rapid   5
population growth has sometimes proved beneficial, fostering lower labor costs or the 
advantages in scale effects that come from higher total demand; others argue for the 
benefits of relatively slow growth in population, on the grounds that lower population 
density encourages higher per capita incomes and higher rates of capital formation.   
These, and other so-called economic explanations, say little explicitly about non-
economic factors and institutions, although this does not mean that the latter are not 
implicit in the analysis.    
Discussions of the role of non-economic factors (encompassing the cultural, 
political, and institutional) in accounting for differences across societies in economic 
development can also be traced back many centuries.   Several of the classic theories for 
the rise of European capitalism and the onset of modern economic growth are based on 
conditions that clearly fall outside of the conventional economic sphere, such as the 
spread of particular religious beliefs, be it the Protestantism pointed to by Max Weber, 
the Judaism highlighted by Werner Sombart, or shifts in the orientation of dominant 
religions.
5  Other arguments stress the important contributions of the advance of scientific 
and rational thought, or the impact of changing tastes for consumer goods and the effects 
on choices between work and leisure on the supply and intensity of labor during early 
industrialization.
6  Changes in legal systems, in degrees of trust and the extent of social 
capital, and in the nature of political organization and the extent of democracy, have more 
recently been advocated as critical factors explaining differentials or shifts in economic 
performance.
7   Although changes in these kinds of circumstances, such as in religion, are 
generally treated as exogenous to the economy, the nature of the interaction between 
economic and so-called “non-economic” factors may be complex.  The contrast in views   6
between Weber and of R.H. Tawney on the relationship between religious changes and 
the rise of capitalism in Britain, and in northern Europe more generally, for example, 
corresponds to similar debates over the sources of change in many other purportedly non-
economic conditions relevant to economic growth.
8  Moreover, the implications of the 
very slow diffusion of cultural change (and of institutional change more generally) and 
economic growth around the world represent a puzzle for those who believe that 
introducing exogenous changes in these facets should have significant, favorable effects 
and constitute a viable instrument of economic policy.
9 
Quite a wide range of non-economic conditions relevant for growth have featured 
in the debates over why Britain was the first industrial nation.  Many can be subsumed in 
the blanket category of culture, where cultural factors are understood to include: religion, 
particularly the impact of non-conformists in the development of technology and 
entrepreneurship in British economy; the scientific spirit and the expansion of 
knowledge, including a willingness to search out new methods and technologies; and the 
emergence of an educational system that permitted a wide diffusion of information and 
skills among the population.  Culture has also been defined to include family and kinship 
patterns; tastes and preferences regarding work versus leisure; time preferences 
determining the levels of savings and consumption, and the development of a wide-
spread desire to financially profit-maximize or pursue material gain more generally.       
Proponents of the view that cultural change was responsible for economic change 
generally point to their coincidence in 18th century Britain, and presume that culture 
consists of behaviors and values that are determined independently of economic factors.  
This may, however, be an artificial distinction, because the economic effects of cultural   7
factors, if not the cultural beliefs themselves, are often greatly influenced by the relative 
costs of different patterns of behavior and the amounts of income that people are willing 
to forgo to obtain chosen ends. 
10 
The recent work on the significance of institutions for understanding why Britain 
industrialized first, and for understanding differences in economic performance more 
generally, gives relatively little attention to the role of culture per se.  In emphasizing 
property rights and other aspects of the British legal framework, it breaks sharply from 
the previous stream of work on institutions by economists who emphasized culture in 
treating the evolution of economies, as part of a critique of classical economic theory.
11  
Current thinking about institutions instead follows the pioneering approach of Douglass 
North in grounding the analysis of the causes and consequences of institutions and 
institutional change on theory.
12  This perspective defines institutions, though difficult to 
do with precision, as encompassing the specific organizations or rules that constrain and 
influence human behavior.  A key aspect of these humanly-devised rules is that they 
structure human actions by providing incentives that shape economic and political 
organization.  Formal rules, plus the informal constraints that develop, influence the costs 
of production and of transaction within society.  Among the institutions that are most 
important for economic performance are those involving the definition and enforcement 
of property rights, between the government and private parties and between the 
individuals within a society.  The link between appropriate institutions and economic 
growth is that institutions reduce the costs of production and distribution, allowing 
private agents more scope to benefit from specialization, investment, and trade.   
Institutions, as human-imposed constraints, are not the only constraints that society or   8
private actors confront, since there are others due to the state of technological knowledge, 
demographic forces, nature (including climate and topography), as well as other features 
of the environment that may also have implications for the patterns of economic 
activity.
13      
Institutions, as described, play several roles in the economy.  They influence the 
beliefs and behaviors of individuals and groups, and thus the preferences and priorities 
expressed through both private and public decisions.  Another important role of 
institutions is providing for efficient property rights, trust, and effective incentives, and 
thus facilitating the organization and conduct of appropriate and constructive transactions 
and interactions among individuals and firms.  Indeed it is claimed, by North and others, 
that it was sound property rights and incentive schemes made possible by its distinctive 
institutions that were key to Britain industrializing first.
14  No economic development is 
possible without secure property rights.  The specification of formal rights is only one 
part of society’s problem however.  The nature of the enforcement of institutional 
provisions, both as to accepted legitimacy and effectiveness, is critical to the success of 
whatever institutions exist.  Similarly, the nature of legislative decisions and judicial 
rulings will influence outcomes, whether or not consistent with the circumstances of the 
adoption of particular institutions.  Enforcement is sometimes bilateral, between 
individuals, with no government role to ensure compliance, but in other cases 
enforcement requires governmental participation and action.  
Although those who stress the importance of the institutional framework have 
somewhat different concerns than those who highlight the significance of culture, the two 
perspectives share an emphasis on the extent to which “non-economic” variables evolve   9
independently of the processes of economic growth.  Indeed, proponents of both views 
champion how the appreciation of this pattern, as well as of the impacts of those variables 
on the economy, constitute a salient intellectual advance over the earlier (circa 1950s 
through 1970s) literature on economic development, which focused primarily on 
economic variables, such as natural resources, physical capital, human capital (mainly 
education), exchange rates, and technical change.  That generation of economists 
certainly accepted the importance of institutions, culture, or political stability, but 
presumed either that the appropriate institutions and beliefs existed already, or else that 
they would evolve in constructive directions relatively easily when the economic factors 
that could generate economic growth were in place.  Since economic forces obviously do 
not operate in a vacuum, it may have been difficult for them to conceive of a non-
institutional interpretation of economic growth.   
Even as a purely logical construct, a wholly non-institutional (or anti-institutional) 
explanation of economic growth seems implausible (as would an explanation that takes 
no account of real economic factors), but as discussed below, debate on the relative 
importance of institutional and non-institutional forces has continued.
15  The essential 
questions, thus, seem to us to be empirical.  How much of the variation in economic 
performance over country and time can be attributed to differences in institutions, with 
pure economic factors constant or endogenous with respect to institutions, and how much 
is due to differences in the economic variables, with institutions constant or endogenous?     
What are the processes that govern the ways specific institutions evolve, and under what 
circumstances can the introduction of exogenous institutional changes be considered 
viable economic policies?         10
      III. 
Although in principle these questions can be framed as empirical issues, it is far 
from easy to clearly distinguish between, or gauge the relative power of, the institutional 
and non-institutional explanations of economic differences.  No one would claim that 
there is a general answer, and indeed few, if any, individual cases seem not to allow some 
role for each type of explanation.  There has been considerable interest in recent years, 
however, in a manner of posing the problem that might appear to make the empirical 
work more tractable: are the key elements in determining institutions exogenous or 
endogenous?  This distinction has been with us a long time, as in the debates over the 
superiority of British institutions, but has figured prominently in the study of how the 
various economies established as colonies by Europeans (or others) developed over time.   
Even in the absence of a substantial indigenous population in the area of settlement, the 
presence of one group in the colony, arriving from the metropolis, and another remaining 
in the metropolis, means that there were different circumstances for institutional 
development.  In principle, therefore, a researcher could evaluate just how much of an 
impact the different circumstances had on the ways the institutions evolved.   That many 
of the European countries established multiple colonies, in very different environments, 
further enhances the quality of the information arising from the natural experiment. 
 If the institutions in the colonies were, or remained, the same as those of the 
metropolitan nation (or perhaps the same as those of the indigenous societies that 
predated the arrival of the Europeans), they might be regarded as exogenous.   In such a 
case, the institutions could be reasonably interpreted as evolving independently of the 
conditions in the respective colonial economies, and systematic patterns in subsequent   11
differences in economic performance across the economies could, after controlling for the 
purely economic factors, be attributed to institutions.  If, however, the institutions in the 
colony diverged in ways that could be explained as adaptations by the respective 
population to the different environment, natural or human, then it would support the view 
that institutions were endogenous with respect to circumstances.  Because institutions are 
human-fashioned structures that presumably reflect the efforts of populations trying to 
make the best of the opportunities and problems they face, most observers would be 
surprised if they were not at least partially endogenous.  Indeed, most scholars feel that 
the institutions that emerged across the colonies established by the Europeans do seem to 
have varied systematically with aspects of the environment such as climate, land type, 
and natural resources.  Some would go even further and suggest that the direction of 
institutional change is often endogenous to the growth process, as changes in technology 
and in incomes generate changes in tastes, changes in the returns to organizing 
production and transactions in various ways, and changes in patterns of behavior more 
generally.   
To acknowledge that there is some endogeneity to institutions does not imply that 
institutions are unimportant, or that they have only a limited impact on economic 
performance.   Endogenous institutions, once in place, can prove as crucial as if they 
were exogenous, and they might persist for as long or even longer.  The key difference 
between those who contend that institutions are exogenous and those who argue they are 
endogenous is not with their impact and influence, but instead with where institutions 
come from and with the extent to which they are -- or might be expected to -- be revised 
over time.      12
It is widely recognized that it is sometimes useful to fix some types of institutions 
over time.  Credible commitment to property rights is perhaps the classic example of the 
value of certainty about policy action.
16  More generally, however, allowing some 
flexibility in institutions, such that they can be altered to make it easier for private or 
public agents to take fuller advantage of the new opportunities that arise as technology or 
the environment changes, would normally be expected to foster better economic 
performance and more rapid growth. Among the many such innovations in institutions 
that could be cited to illustrate the utility of institutions changing as conditions change are 
those underlying the modern patent system, those providing for public provision of 
education, those responsible for the organization of corporations where shareholders are 
protected because they have limited liability, and those responsible for the establishment 
of central or quasi-central banks such as the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England.   
Determining the optimum degree of flexibility in, and designing mechanisms well suited 
to respond constructively to ever-changing circumstances with institutional change, are 
complex issues.  While some see the role of constitutional provisions as a means of 
ensuring stability in the decision-making process and institutions more generally, most 
constitutions do have provisions for amendments, and allow some degree of legislative 
and governmental flexibility in setting the legal structure.  Allowance for modifications 
to the laws need not harm the potential for growth, nor even yield instability, particularly 
given that the voting and other costs of implementing changes are typically high.
17 
Indeed, there are likely more cases of how nations and economies suffered from 
inflexible institutions than from excessive flexibility.
18   13
Perhaps the most important elements of institutional structures are those that 
ensure an ability to adapt to different conditions and to adjust to new circumstances as 
seems necessary, rather than those that entail the retention and maintenance of any 
specific set of policies.  The capability for adaptation, based in part on the population’s 
education and their political liberties, may ultimately be more significant for economic 
growth than the continuation of any particular set of beliefs, rules, or behavior.  This was 
likely significant in the case of European expansion, where there was geographic 
movement to different environments, with new sorts of climates, soil types, natural 
resources, and economic problems to grapple with.  As shall be discussed below, even if 
there were some specific cultural carryovers from Europe to the Americas, and these did 
play a role early in the settlement process, it is not clear that these factors were 
immutable or remained unchanged for long periods.  The confrontation with a new 
environment that offered rich opportunities, but in unfamiliar contexts, led to some 
adaptations, adjustments, and innovations in institutions in the interests of economic 
improvement.   
Another issue that is central to understanding how institutions matter for growth 
concerns the likelihood that no one particular narrowly-specified institution is required, 
as there are often alternative institutional forms or structures that are reasonable 
substitutes for each other and may achieve similar economic performance.   Those who 
hold this view that non-optimal institutions may still be consistent with high rates of 
economic growth, though perhaps not the highest rate that was possible, often point to the 
stark contrasts across industrialized countries in the importance of banks relative to 
securities markets in financial intermediation, in the reliance on common or civil law, in   14
how bankruptcy laws balance the rights of creditors and debtors, in systems and levels of 
taxation, and in the division of power between the executive, the legislature, and political 
party structures.  These and many other examples, historical and contemporary, suggest 
the usefulness of institutions generally in helping societies take advantage of the 
opportunities the environment offers them, but support the idea that no single institutional 
solution is crucial.  In this way, the role of institutions might be considered analogous to 
the role of technology, in that the processes of change are important but no single method 
of accomplishing a goal is indispensable.
19 
A perhaps more serious issue is that among the feasible set of institutional 
solutions to a general problem, different approaches may have different implications for 
different segments of the population.  Depending upon the manner in which institutions 
evolve, or are designed, in a society, they may develop to favor the interests of more 
powerful groups at the expense of others, or even of the population at large.  For 
example, elites might prefer policies that raise their share of national income, even if they 
reduce long-run rates of growth. The nature of the political power structure in society is 
critical in determining which institutions are adopted.  The suffrage, or the distribution of 
political influence more generally, may be rather broad and inclusive, with a relatively 
large share of the population able to vote.
20  Or, alternatively, the franchise may be 
limited, by requirements of literacy, wealth, nationality, age, and gender, with only a 
small minority of the population able to vote and to directly influence policy.  When the 
suffrage is restricted, many members of society have only very limited political influence 
and no direct voice in establishing the institutional framework.  Even a very small 
segment of the population, but one with highly disproportionate political power, would be   15
able to establish institutions, legal codes, and property rights regimes that serve their own 
interests, and be able to exclude other members of society from benefits.
21  Thus, there 
could well be a well- defined and enforced set of property rights, but one coincident with 
a large component of the population being outsiders to decision-making in society.
22   
Slave societies in the Americas often had well-defined institutions and property 
rights, and were capable of rapid economic growth, but part of their population had no 
rights and no means to obtain any.  They provide a powerful example, albeit an extreme 
one, of how the determination of the size and nature of the elite groups, by political, 
economic, and/or military means, is critical to the establishment of institutions.  Being 
excluded from voting does not necessarily mean a failure to benefit from economic 
change, nor that there will not be subsequent improvements in the rights to suffrage, but 
the limited nature of the decision-making group still raises important issues for our 
understanding of the distribution of rewards from economic activity.  More generally, the 
observation that societies vary in how much influence different segments of the 
population can exert in shaping institutions implies that there may be systematic patterns 
in how flexible they are in adapting (or innovating) their institutions to enhance their the 
ability of their populations to take advantage of new opportunities created by changes in 
the environment.     
IV. 
To better understand the role of institutions in economic growth it will be useful 
to examine some historical examples in which different institutions have impacted on the 
economy.  It is no doubt easier to isolate the effect of institutions if we believe that they 
are exogenously determined by the forces of past history or by forces outside of the   16
current economy.  Among the factors that have sometimes been suggested as playing this 
role are: externally generated changes in mentalité due to change in religious belief or 
secular attitudes; the outcome of a military conflict, either due to externally generated 
changes in the power structure or of internal revolutionary actions that altered the balance 
of political power; the non-military introduction of new foreign influence and contacts, 
reflecting, in part, improvements in transportation and communication; and, as shall be 
discussed in more detail below, the settling of new areas by people from a distant 
metropolis, whose institutions could be regarded as exogenous to the new area of 
settlement. In this context we consider non-institutional explanations to be not an absence 
of institutions (since that is not possible), but the presence of institutions regarded as 
endogenous to the socio-economic process, even when the circumstances giving rise to 
the institutions are themselves exogenous to the economy (as, e.g., climate and natural 
resources). 
In evaluating whether institutions are endogenous, there are several approaches 
that could be taken.  One concerns the impact of resources and natural and human 
endowments upon institutions.  A number of scholars have recently argued that there 
were systematic patterns in the types of institutions that evolved as settlers in European 
colonies adjusted to conditions that differed from those of the metropolis in terms of 
disease environments and economic opportunities.
23 Subjecting this notion to empirical 
testing is complicated by the enormous range of institutions that attention could be 
directed at, some of which reflect metropolitan carryovers, others of which developed 
very differently in the colonies than they did in the metropolis.  Metropolitan institutions 
did not necessarily disappear in the process of settlement, but many were modified   17
depending on the conditions of the particular settlement.  Thus English New World 
colonies may have employed English law, and French colonies continued French legal 
institutions, but English and French temperate zone colonies differed in many important 
regards from the respective Caribbean colonies.  French and English Caribbean colonies 
had greater similarities than they did with either their mainland counterparts or the 
metropolis.  And, while the initial controls over free white labor may have been much the 
same in all of the colonies, only some English colonies and only some French colonies 
came to rely on free, rather than slave, labor. 
24  Climate and resources were the most 
powerful determinants of the geographic incidence of slave labor, irrespective of the 
metropolitan institutional structure.  Slavery was legal in all the British colonies until the 
Revolutionary War, and differences in legal circumstances did not account for the 
significant differences in the relative importance of slavery in New England and the 
South.
25   
Another approach to the question of whether institutions are endogenous to the 
process of economic change, is to consider whether economic growth itself influences 
people’s attitudes, and the nature of the economy’s institutions.  Does the economy itself 
contain the seeds of its own limitations, whether due to its failure or its successes?  Karl 
Marx is certainly the most prominent of historical economists that have posited a 
sequence of self-generated endogenous changes in society, from feudalism to capitalism 
to socialism, with each of the first two stages being successful at first but then failing due 
to internal contradictions.  Joseph Schumpeter claimed that the declining belief in the 
value of capitalism, which developed with economic growth, weakened capitalism’s 
survival power, and he expected the “march into socialism” to occur based upon the   18
economy’s success.  Mancur Olson argued that as economies develop over time, vested 
interests operating in their own self-interest emerge and cause a reduction in the future 
growth of the economy through their success at rent seeking.   Other causes of self-
generated changes in the economy and economic structures include the growth of large 
industry and the development of bureaucracies in business and government, both of 
which can force institutional changes.  
Scholars interested in how institutions evolve have recently devoted much 
attention to the contrasts between colonial and metropolitan influences on institutions in 
newly settled areas.  A long-standing disagreement, tracing back centuries, regarding the 
thirteen colonies that became the United States has been the causes of North-South 
differences in economic and demographic structures, including the explanation of the 
differences in the relative importance of slavery.  Did those settling in different parts of 
the mainland arrive with rather different cultural patterns from Britain, differences that 
persisted after settlement, or did the various colonists from Britain arrive with basically 
similar cultural beliefs, but then adjusted their institutions once established in the New 
World and confronted with a rather different set of conditions?
26   The evidence to date 
seems to favor the latter view.  Not only has recent work demonstrated that even the 
Puritans were deeply influenced by the environment in selecting institutions for their two 
New World colonies, but studies of those Englishmen who came to populate the various 
settlements in the Americas emphasize how they were drawn from roughly the same 
social classes.
27  In the words of Edward Channing:  
“Historical writers have been altogether too prone to draw a hard and fast line of 
demarcation between the settlers of the Southern colonies and those who founded 
colonies north of the fortieth parallel … It is sometimes said that the Northern 
colonist came to the New World for conscience sake and the Southern planters   19
sought wealth alone; but no such generalization can truthfully be made.   
Moreover, it is oftentimes the custom to point out some mysterious differences   
between the Virginian and the New Englander, which can be expressed by the 
words ‘cavalier’ and ‘Puritan’ …  No such characterization is possible.”  
28 
 
This perspective receives strong support from the record of slavery in the 
Americas.  The basis for the success (to the owners) of slave labor in one area, and its 
failure in another, depended less on the initial attitudes of most settlers than upon the 
influence of climate and soil resources on the nature of those crops which could be grown 
and the technology and scales of efficient crop production.  Wherever the soils and 
climates were suitable for growing sugar, the most valuable commodity in world trade 
during the 17
th and 18
th centuries and a crop that could be produced at lowest cost on 
large slave plantations (under the gang labor system, which allowed owners to achieve 
very high labor intensity), slavery became the dominant institution of labor (and those of 
African descent a dominant share of the population).  Elsewhere, where soils and 
climates favored agricultural products, such as grains and hays, where the gang labor 
system and slave labor offered no particular advantages, landowners had to rely more on 
free (often their own) labor, as the productivity of slaves in such settings would not 
warrant the high prices for slaves that prevailed on world markets.  The populations of 
these settlements accordingly came to be much more homogeneous in wealth, human 
capital, ethnicity, and other dimensions.   Thus, the factor endowments in the various 
colonies had a major impact on determining which labor institutions were dominant, the 
distribution of rewards between laborers and landowners, and the nature of political 
participation and decision-making.  Because slavery was legal in all of the European 
colonies in the Americas, it is evident that not only did these natural forces lead to   20
differences in institutions, but they also led to different outcomes from similar 
institutions.  Although the Old World background was surely important, it is difficult to 
explain the extreme differences among the various areas within each colonial empire 
without reference to the effects of the New World circumstances.  
The early history of the New World colonies established by the European nations 
permits one to examine some of the implications of focusing on exogenous factors in 
institutional development, as opposed to viewing institutions as largely endogenous.  The 
locations of settlements were themselves subject to some choice, based on the 
demographic and economic characteristics of different locations. Moreover, the pattern of 
initial settlement was modified over time, as settlers learned more about prospects in 
different areas.  In the settlement of the Caribbean by the British and the French, for 
example, the adjustments in terms of crops and labor institutions that took place over the 
first half-century of settlement were rather different from those that were to emerge in 
subsequent years.  The problems that arise from selection by the colonizing powers 
notwithstanding, the natural experiment arising from the variety of settling metropolises – 
including Spain, Portugal, Britain, France, and Holland – and the extreme diversity of 
environments found among the colonies makes for a wonderful laboratory in which to 
study the relationships between factor endowments, institutions, and economic growth.  It 
should not be surprising that many scholars have been attracted to work in this 
laboratory.  Their work, of course, does not amount to a comparison of institutional and 
non-institutional factors in economic growth, since everyone agrees on the importance of 
institutions.  Rather the work has sought to determine whether institutions can be 
understood as exogenous to the circumstances or economic system, or whether the   21
environment or circumstances more broadly exert a powerful influence on how 
institutions emerge and evolve over time.  Put simply, where do institutions come from?    
A key economic question is the explanation for the post-1900 differences in levels 
of per capita income between the countries of mainland North America and those of Latin 
America (Table 3), differences that were much smaller during the colonial period.  A 
closely related issue is why Latin America is the region of the world today with the most 
extreme inequality in income.   Since the nations of South and Central America had been 
settled mainly by the Spanish (the Portuguese settled Brazil), and the United States and 
Canada mainly by the British (pre-1763 Canada by the French and pre-1664 New York 
by the Dutch, among the relatively less dominant settling nations), the traditional, and 
still popular, explanation holds that the different cultures, religions, and institutions of 
Britain and Spain could alone explain the divergent paths of economic development.  
Since there were sharp contrasts between the home countries of Britain and Spain in 
terms of economic and political structures, it is argued that the transfer of Old World 
institutions established the behavior of the economies and societies of the colonies in the 
New World, as differences in property rights determination and enforcement, legal 
frameworks more generally, economic goals, and in religions beliefs were thought to 
have been carried over, with little or no modification, into the new areas of settlement.  
The institutions that failed to generate sustained economic growth on the Iberian 
peninsula likewise failed to do so in the New World, whereas the institutions that had 
evolved over centuries in Britain worked on both sides of the Atlantic. The logic is that 
either the political elites of the metropolis were carried over into the colonies, providing 
the political and legal framework for the successful carryover of institutions, or that the   22
elites in the New World, though different from those of the metropolis, were able to use 
the same institutional structures to achieve similar ends by similar means.
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An alternative explanation, one that has gained an increasing number of adherents 
of late, focuses on the economic and geographic circumstances in the area of settlement, 
and their influence on the determination of institutions in the new areas.  As with the 
previous argument, there is a long literature on the role of climate and resources in 
influencing institutions and economic development.  While a most detailed examination 
was provided by Montesquieu in the 1740’s, a similar argument was made considerably 
earlier by Plato.
30  The links include the nature of the effects of climate upon the 
willingness to work, the desire to emigrate or immigrate, the role played by slavery in 
society, and related economic concerns.  Whether seen as the basic cause of the specific 
set of institutions, or as a reason to modify some pre-existing set of exogenous 
institutions, settlement societies can be argued to have been significantly influenced by 
factors other than some unchanged metropolitan institutions.  Indeed most settlements 
made dramatic changes in their institutions after they were first established, in the search 
for ways to enhance their profitability and survivability.  The impact of climate and 
resources can also help to explain why the different areas settled by the same 
metropolitan power had rather different economic structures and performances (as, e.g., 
New England and the British West Indies), and why geographically contiguous and 
resource-similar areas settled by different metropolitan powers (as the British and French 
in the West Indies, as well as the Spanish, Danish, and Dutch there) came to resemble 
each other in many important ways.  Indeed, recent scholarship has found strong 
evidence of the systematic effects of initial factor endowments on the types of institutions   23
(including institutions involving suffrage and the conduct of elections, schooling, finance, 
the disposition of public lands, property rights, and intellectual property) that evolved in 
different colonies (and on long-term economic performance in these colonies), both in the 
Americas and elsewhere, and highlighted how limited is the explanatory power of 
national heritage.
31 
A specific example of how institutions can be altered to fit changing 
circumstances, and of how the distribution of power (both political and economic) as well 
as the environment influence outcomes, is provided by the adjustments in the societies of 
the Americas to the abolition of slavery.
32  This most dramatic institutional change of the 
19
th century was, almost everywhere, imposed on a resistant slaveholding class in the 
aftermath of armed conflict or by a government elected by a population dominated by 
non-slaveholders (including European parliaments).  All New World societies ended 
slavery between 1777 and 1888, and the nature of the abolitions were similar with most 
providing some form of compensation, in cash, bonds, or labor time to the slaveowners, 
with very little or nothing going to the former slaves.
33  Nevertheless there were some 
striking differences in the range of post-emancipation responses.  In the British West 
Indies, for example, slavery was abolished by 1834 and all colonial governments had the 
same basic goal of inducing labor to work on plantations and imposed legislation to try to 
accomplish this end. Different environments led to different outcomes, however, as 
evident in the corresponding variation with the ratio of land to labor (see Table 4).
34 
Areas of high population density such as Barbados maintained plantation systems and 
high sugar output, while those with low population density, with abundant frontier land, 
initially saw the end of the plantation system and a decline in sugar output.  In those cases   24
where the islands had been relatively unproductive, sugar output continued to decline and 
the plantation system was never re-introduced.  However, in those areas where land was 
highly productive and which had been growing rapidly before emancipation (such as 
Trinidad and British Guiana), plantation systems returned in several decades, but ones 
based on indentured labor drawn mainly from India, and not on ex-slaves.  Thus the 
elite’s ability to achieve their desired end, extracting the returns to the land they owned, 
was influenced by various other conditions, including resource endowments, and their 
efforts to achieve their goals, subject to the dissimilar constraints they faced, led to 
differences in institutional development.  
  Another example of how the evolution of institutions across New World societies 
reflected adjustments to different or changed circumstances is provided by the history of 
how broadly the franchise was extended over time and what fractions of respective 
populations actually voted in elections. Since most of the societies in the Americas had 
achieved independence from their colonial masters, and were at least nominal 
democracies, by the middle of the 19
th century, suffrage institutions had a direct bearing 
on the extent to which elites based largely on wealth, human capital, and gender held 
disproportionate political power in their respective countries, and on their ability to shape 
government policies.  The ability and inclination of the elites to maintain disproportionate 
political influence through the formal rules associated with the electoral process varied 
with a variety of circumstances.  Among these circumstances was the extent of inequality 
in wealth, human capital, and political influence that existed at the time of independence, 
when there were generally conventions held to draw up constitutions for the new nations.  
Presumably, the greater the disparity in resources (which we have argued in other work   25
was due to factor endowments during initial colonization), the greater was the ability of 
an elite to frame the rules in such a way as to preserve their relative political power.
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Among the other factors that appear to have had significant effects on the way institutions 
evolved, however, was the relative scarcity of labor.  Although elites may generally be 
reluctant to share their access to political influence and economic opportunity with other 
segments of the population, they should be more likely to do so in settings where they 
would benefit from attracting or retaining a scarce resource – labor.              
  The evidence on the evolution of suffrage institutions in the New World is quite 
consistent with this view. Summary information on how the right to vote was restricted 
across New World societies in the 19
th and early 20
th centuries is reported in Table 5. The 
estimates reveal that the United States and Canada were the clear leaders in doing away 
with restrictions based on wealth and literacy and introducing the secret ballot, and much 
higher fractions of the populations voted in these countries than anywhere else in the 
Americas.  These societies were distinguished for their relative equality, population 
homogeneity, and scarcity of labor, and it is notable that others of British heritage, such 
as Barbados, generally retained stringent restrictions on the franchise well into the 20
th 
century.   Moreover, it is striking that the leaders in extending the suffrage in South and 
Central America, such as Uruguay, Argentina, and Costa Rica, are generally regarded as 
having been historically the most egalitarian of Latin American societies, and having 
initial factor endowments most closely resembling those of the United States and Canada. 
  The contrast between North and South America in the application of binding 
restrictions on the franchise was not so evident at the outset. Despite the sentiments 
popularly attributed to the Founding Fathers, voting in the United States was largely a   26
privilege reserved for white men with significant amounts of property until early in the 
nineteenth century.  By 1815, only four states had adopted universal white male suffrage, 
but as the movement to do away with political inequality gained strength, the rest of the 
country followed suit: virtually all new entrants to the Union extended voting rights to all 
white men (with explicit racial restrictions generally introduced in the same state 
constitutions that did away with economic requirements), and older states revised their 
laws in the wake of protracted political debates (see Table 6). The key states of New 
York and Massachusetts made the break with wealth restrictions in the 1820s, and the 
shift to full white adult male suffrage was largely complete by the late 1850s (with Rhode 
Island, Virginia, and North Carolina being the laggards). The relatively more egalitarian 
populations of the western states, which were anxious to increase their populations, were 
the clear leaders in the movement. The rapid extension of access to the franchise in these 
areas not coincidentally paralleled liberal policies toward public schools and access to 
land, as well as other policies that were expected to be attractive to potential migrants.   
The frontier states in the West continued to be labor scarce, with low female to male 
ratios, and it is perhaps not surprising that late in the 19
th century they were the leaders in 
extending suffrage to women, as well as in greatly strengthening the property rights 
available to married women.  
  Similar political movements with similar outcomes followed with a short lag in 
the various Canadian provinces, but the analogous developments did not occur in Latin 
America until the twentieth century. As a result, through 1940 the United States and 
Canada routinely had proportions voting that were 50 to 100 percent higher than their 
most progressive neighbors to the South, three times higher than Mexico, and up to five   27
to ten times higher than countries such as Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and even Chile. It is 
remarkable that as late as 1900, none of the countries in Latin America had the secret 
ballot or more than a miniscule fraction of the population casting votes. The great 
majority of European nations, as well as the United States and Canada, achieved secrecy 
in balloting and universal adult male suffrage long before other countries in the western 
hemisphere, and the proportions of the populations voting in the former were always 
higher, often four to five times higher, than those in the latter. Although many factors 
may have contributed to the low levels of participation in South America and the 
Caribbean, wealth and literacy requirements were serious binding constraints.   
What accounts for this pattern of diffusion of universal male suffrage across New 
World societies?   One obvious explanation is that differences in the degrees of inequality 
in wealth, human capital, and political influence were related to the likelihood of 
adopting such an institutional change. The cross-sectional patterns, as well as the 
histories indicating that the attainment of universal male suffrage and of the secret ballot 
was often the product of a long series of hard fought political battles, with the elites more 
likely to be opposed to liberalizing the franchise, are certainly consistent with this view.
36 
Another important factor, however, was the desire to attract immigrants. It is striking that 
pioneers in extending suffrage, such as new (those after the original thirteen) states in the 
United States, Argentina, and Uruguay, did so during periods in which they hoped to 
attract migrants, such that the rights to suffrage formed part of a package of policies 
thought to be potentially attractive to those contemplating relocation. When elites -- such 
as large holders of land or other assets -- desire common men to locate in the polity, they 
thus may choose to extend access to privileges and opportunities without threat of civil   28
disorder; indeed, a polity (or one set of elites) may find itself competing with another to 
attract the labor or whatever else is desired. Alternative explanations, such as the 
importance of national heritage, are not very useful in identifying why Argentina, 
Uruguay, and Costa Rica pulled so far ahead of their Latin American neighbors, or why 
other British colonies in the New World lagged behind Canada.
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      V. 
 There are always institutions present, and we cannot conceive of a framework for 
making sense of the processes of economic development that does not include a role for 
them.  There is, moreover, no doubt that for any given society some institutions may limit 
the extent to which it realizes its potential economic output, while alternatives might do 
better.  That being said, however, it is unclear how firmly theories of economic growth 
can be grounded on institutions. Economists do not have a very good understanding of 
where institutions come from, or why some societies have institutions that seem 
conducive to growth, while others are burdened by institutions less favorable for 
economic performance.  Until they do, it will be quite difficult to specify the precise role 
of institutions in processes of growth.   
As we have sought to highlight in this essay, what little we presently know about 
the evolution of institutions suggests caution about making strong claims about their 
relationship to growth.  First, it is clear that very different institutional structures often 
seem to be reasonable substitutes in being conducive to growth, both in dissimilar as well 
as in similar contexts.  Narrow definitions of institutional requirements for growth do not, 
accordingly, seem appropriate.  Second, the case for attributing growth to institutions is   29
weaker if institutions are endogenous rather than exogenous, and the evidence that there 
are systematic patterns to the ways institutions evolve makes the latter view problematic.  
The recent studies of the natural experiment in institutional development provided by the 
European colonization of the Americas (and of many other parts of the globe), for 
example, imply that the broad environment (reflecting factor endowments, social 
arrangements, or technology) had powerful effects on the sorts of institutions that 
evolved in respective colonies.  Institutions obviously matter for growth, but the way we 
understand how they matter will be somewhat different if the agents and other forces 
shaping institutions are responsive to the conditions they face than if institutions develop 
independently of (or could be imposed in any) context.   
The recognitions that the institutional structure appropriate for one environment 
may not be appropriate for another, and that the history of institutions in high-performing 
societies is one of change over time in response to changing circumstances, suggest a 
different perspective on the relation between institutions and growth.  Although we all 
understand that there are favorable aspects to governments making credible commitments 
to various obligations or arrangements they enter into, such as enforcement of property 
rights, it is also clear that in theory one would want institutions to vary over time and 
place with the environment, technology, and values.  One might, therefore, think of 
societies with institutions conducive for growth as being those that have exhibited greater 
institutional flexibility -- where by institutional flexibility we mean the ease with which 
institutional adaptations that respond constructively to changes in circumstances are 
innovated and/or diffused.  Societies with good institutions would, therefore, have 
institutions well adapted for economic performance in their specific settings because they   30
had implemented a series of institutional modifications or innovations (public and 
private) that cumulatively generated improvements in welfare.  Societies with bad 
institutions are those with institutional inflexibility, whose institutions did not respond 
constructively to take advantage of the opportunities created by their environment and 
state of knowledge.   Such a framework would encourage scholars interested in the 
relation between institutions and growth to devote more attention to the factors 
influencing the rate and direction of institutional change, and rather less attention to the 
quest for a set of institutional structures that would be universally effective at promoting 
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 Table 1 
 
Levels Of Per Capita GDP And Interregional Differences, 1500-1998 
 
(1990 international dollars) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   1500   1820   1870   1913   1950   1973   1998 
 
Western Europe     774    1232    1974    3473    4594             11534             17921   
 
Western Offshoots     400    1201    2431    5257    9288             16172             26146      
 
Japan         500      669      737           1387    1926             11439             20413     
 
Asia (excl. Japan)     572      575      543      640      635     1231       2936 
 
Latin America      416      665      698    1511    2554     4531     5795  
 
Eastern Europe     483      667      917    1501     2601     5729     4354 
 
Africa        400      418      444      585      852     1365     1368     
 
World       565       667       867   1510   2114     4104     5709 
 
 
Interregional Spreads      2:1       3:1      5:1      9:1     15:1      13:1     19:1 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Maddison 2001. 
 




Per Capita GDP In Western Europe, 1500-1998 
 
(1990 international dollars) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   1500   1600   1700   1820   1870     1913   1998    
 
Austria         707     837      993    1218    1863               3465              18905 
Belgium       875     976    1144     1319    2697     4220             19442      
Denmark       738     875    1039    1274    2003     3912             22123     
Finland       453     538      638      781    1140     2111             18324   
France        727     841      986    1230     1876     3485             19558   
Germany       676     777      894    1058    1821     3648             17799   
Italy                 1100              1100    1100    1117    1499     2564             17759   
Netherlands       754             1368    2110    1821    2753     4049             20224     
Norway       640     760      900    1104    1432     2501             23660     
Portugal       632     773      854      963      997     1244             12929    
Spain         698     900      900    1063    1376     2255             14227   
Sweden        695     824      977    1198    1664     3096             18685   
Switzerland       742     880    1044     1280    2202     4266             21367   
United Kingdom     714     974    1250    1707    3191     4921             18714   
 
Total Western Europe    774     894    1024    1232    1974     3473             17921   
 
World       565     593       615       667     867     1510     5709 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Maddison 2001. 
 
  TABLE 3  
 




(i) GDP  per 
capita relative 
to the United 
States 
Country  1700 1800 1900 1997 
Argentina  — 102 52  35 
Barbados 150  —  —  51 
Brazil  — 50 10 22 
Chile  — 46 38 42 
Cuba 167  112  —  — 
Mexico  89 50 35 28 
Peru  — 41 20 15 
Canada  — — 67 76 
      
United States
a   550  807  3,859  20,230 
Source: Sokoloff and Engerman (2000).  
a. U.S. per capita GDP is measured in 1985 dollars.    42
TABLE 4 
 
Land/Labor Ratios, Changes In Sugar Production In The British 
Slaves Colonies Prior To And After Emancipation, And Contract Labor Immigration 
 
 
      Land/Labor    % Change     Ratio of Sugar       Contract Labor 
           Ratio
1    in Annual      Production in   Immigration 
           Sugar Prod.        1887-96 to    1834-1918 
                       1824-33 to            1839-46             (gross inflow)   
                                                       1839-46 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Antigua          3.1         +8.7%    1.5        2,600 
Barbados          1.7         +5.5    3.5          -- 
St. Kitts
2          2.9         +3.8              2.7        2,900   
Nevis            5.0        -43.1     
(2)          
(2)  
Trinidad        47.7       +21.7
3              3.0    157,700 
British Guiana     832.4       - 43.0              3.4    301,000 
Mauritius          8.0       +54.3    3.1    451,800 
Dominica        16.3        - 6.4    0.7        6,000   
St. Lucia        15.5       -21.8    1.7        5,200 
Montserrat          4.6       -43.7    2.5          -- 
St. Vincent          5.7       -47.5    0.7        5,600 
Tobago          8.8       -47.5    (3)          
(3
)  
Jamaica        12.2       -51.2    0.6      53,900   
Grenada          6.3       -55.9    0.0           6,200   
______________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Engerman 1996.     
 
                                                 
1 Square Miles per thousand total population, just prior to abolition. 
2 Nevis data merged with St. Kitts after 1882.  
 
 
3 Trinidad output did decline slightly after abolition, and it was not until 1845 that the 1834 level of output 
was regained.  Tobago data merged with Trinidad after 1891.  The 1877-86 level of sugar production in 
Tobago was about one-third less than it was in 1824-33. 
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TABLE 5  
 
Laws Governing the Franchise and the Extent of Voting  
in Selected New World Countries, 1840–1940 
 
         












         
1840–80        —  
Chile 1869  No  Yes  Yes  1.6 
 1878  No  No  No
a — 
Costa  Rica  1890  Yes Yes Yes — 
Ecuador  1848  Yes Yes Yes 0.0 
  1856  Yes Yes Yes 0.1 
Mexico  1840  Yes Yes Yes — 
Peru  1875  Yes Yes Yes — 
Uruguay  1840  Yes Yes Yes — 
  1880  Yes Yes Yes — 
Venezuela  1840  Yes Yes Yes — 
  1880  Yes Yes Yes — 
         
Canada 1867  Yes  Yes  No  7.7 
  1878  No Yes No  12.9 
United  States  1850  No No No  12.9 
  1880  No No No  18.3 
         
1881–1920         
Argentina 1896  Yes Yes Yes  1.8
b 
  1916  No No No  9.0 
Brazil  1894  Yes Yes Yes 2.2 
  1914  Yes Yes Yes 2.4 
Chile  1881  No No No  3.1 
 1920  No  No  Yes  4.4 
Colombia 1918
c  No No No  6.9 
Costa  Rica  1912  Yes Yes Yes — 
 1919  Yes  No  No  10.6 
Ecuador 1888  No  Yes  Yes  2.8 
 1894  No  No  Yes  3.3 
Mexico  1920  No No No  8.6 
Peru  1920  Yes Yes Yes — 
Uruguay  1900  Yes Yes Yes — 
  1920  No No No  13.8 
Venezuela  1920  Yes Yes Yes — 
         
Canada  1911  No No No  18.1 
  1917  No No No  20.5 
United States  1900  No  No  Yes
d 18.4 







       
Argentina  1928  No No No  12.8 
  1937  No No No  15.0 
Bolivia 1951  -  Yes  Yes  4.1 
Brazil  1930  Yes Yes Yes 5.7 
Colombia  1930  No No No  11.1 
  1936  No No No  5.9 
Chile 1920  No  No  Yes  4.4 
 1931  No  No  Yes  6.5 
 1938  No  No  Yes  9.4 
Costa  Rica 1940  No No No  17.6 
Ecuador 1940  No  No  Yes  3.3 
Mexico  1940  No No No  11.8 
Peru 1940  No  No  Yes  — 
Uruguay  1940  No No No  19.7 
Venezuela 1940  No  Yes  Yes  — 













United States  1940  No  No  Yes  37.8 
 
 
Source: Engerman, Haber, and Sokoloff (2000). 
a.  After having eliminated wealth and education requirements in 1878, Chile instituted a literacy 
requirement in 1887, which seems to have been responsible for a sharp decline in the proportion of the 
population that was registered to vote.  
b.
 This figure is for the city of Buenos Aires, and it likely overstates the proportion who voted at the 
national level.   
c.
 The information on restrictions refers to national law.  The 1863 Constitution empowered provincial 
state governments to regulate electoral affairs.  Afterward, elections became restricted (in terms of the 
franchise for adult males) and indirect in some states.  It was not until 1948 that a national law established 
universal adult male suffrage throughout the country.  
 This pattern was followed in other Latin American 
countries, as it was in the United States and Canada to a lesser extent.   
d. Eighteen states introduced literacy requirements between 1890 and 1926.     45
TABLE 6 
 
Summary Of Economic-Based Qualifications For Suffrage 
 
Across The United States, 1787-1860 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
      Qualification in 1787         Year Economic Qualifications  





New  Hampshire    Tax    1792 
Massachusetts       Property    1821 (prop), tax req. in 1860 
Rhode Island        Property    1842 (prop), tax req. in 1860 
Connecticut     Property   1818  (prop),  1845  (tax) 
New  York     Property   1821  (prop),  1826  (tax) 
New  Jersey     Property   1807  (prop),  1844  (tax) 
Pennsylvania        Tax                          tax req. in 1860 
Delaware        Property    1792 (prop), tax req. in 1860 
Maryland     Property   1802   
Virginia     Property   1850 
North Carolina      Property    1856 (prop), tax req. in 1860 
South  Carolina   Tax    1810  (tax) 





Vermont     none  (1791) 
Kentucky     none  (1792) 
Tennessee     none  (1796) 
Ohio      Tax  (1803)   1851  (tax) 
Louisiana     Tax  (1812)   1845  (tax) 
Indiana    none  (1816)    
Mississippi     Tax  (1817)   1832  (tax) 
Illinois      none  (1818) 
Maine        none  (1819)    
Alabama     none  (1819) 




Sources and Notes:  Engerman and Sokoloff 2001.   
 
 